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Defining a Particular Social Group Based on Gender 
Abstract 
It is now accepted in refugee jurispru- 
dence that gender-based social groups 
fall within the meaning of Particular 
Social Group for purposes of according 
Convention refugee protection. How- 
ever, the criteria for iden tifyinggender- 
based social groups remains to be 
settled. The tendency has been to iden- 
tify the at-risk group by the common 
victimization which confronts group 
members. This is neither innatenorcon- 
stant. The author takes the position that 
thegroup should simply be identified by 
the gender of its members-women, al- 
though there may be subgroups of 
women united by other characteris tics 
suchas race, nationality or religion. Not 
all group members will automatically 
be eligible for refugee protection; only 
women who aregenuinely at risk of per- 
secution will be accorded Convention 
refugee status. 
Prccis 
I1 est maintenant reconnu, dans la ju- 
risprudence en mati2re de droit des re'- 
fugits, que les groupes sociaux fonde's 
sur le sexage sont un type de groupe 
social particulier auxfins de l'allocation 
des protections dues aux re'figie's en 
vertu de la Convention. Cependant, le 
crit2re d'identification des groupes so- 
ciaux fonde's sur le sexage reste a de'fi- 
nir. La tendance a e'te' h identifier les 
groupes h risque par le dhominateur 
commun de la victimisation h laquelle 
les membres du groupe sont confront&. 
Ceci n'es t ni une inhhence ni une cons- 
tance. L'auteure du pre'sent article as- 
sume la position que le groupe devrait 
simplement &re identif?e' de par le sexe 
de ses membres: des femmes, quoiqu'il y 
ait des sous-groupes de femmes unis par 
d'autres caracthistiques, telles la race, 
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la nationalite'ou la religion. Ce ne sont 
pas tous les membres du groupe qui se- 
ront automatiquemen t Bigibles au s ta- 
tut de re'fugie': seules les femmes qui sont 
re'ellement confrontdes It un se'rieux 
danger de perse'cution obtiendrons le 
statut de rt@gie'es en vertu de la Con- 
vention. 
Eligibility for Convention refugee pro- 
tection depends on the ability to estab- 
lish a nexus between a well-founded 
fear of persecution and the claimant's 
civil or political status. The Conven- 
tion refugee regime limits protection 
to persons who face a genuine fear of 
persecution by reason of their race, 
nationality, religion, political opinion 
or membership of a particular social 
group. The particular social group cat- 
egory is proving to be a very versatile 
ground for recognizing claims arising 
from gender-based persecution and 
other non-enumerated grounds for 
according convention refugee status. 
Contemporary jurisprudence on the 
definition of "Convention refugee" 
unequivocally recognizes that "gen- 
der" is a particular social group. 
Hathaway states that "Gender-based 
groups are clear examples of social 
subsets defined by an innate and im- 
mutable characteristic. Thus, while 
gender is not an independent enumer- 
ated ground for Convention protec- 
tion, it is properly within the ambit of 
the social group category."l 
In A.G. v. Ward, the Supreme Court 
of Canada stressed the element of im- 
mutability in defining a "membership 
in a particular social group." After re- 
viewing scholarship and jurispru- 
dence on the meaning of the particular 
social group category, Mr. Justice La 
Forest identified three possible catego- 
ries for defining a social group within 
the meaning of the Convention refu- 
gee definition. These are groups de- 
fined by an innate or unchangeable 
characteristic; groups whose members 
voluntarily associate for reasons so 
fundamental to their human dignity 
that they should not be forced to for- 
sake the association; and groups asso- 
ciated by a former voluntary status, 
unalterable due to its historicalperma- 
nence.2 
Reference to an innate characteris- 
tic, such as sex, as defining a particular 
social group ensures that women or a 
subset of women in a particular society 
may be considered a particular social 
group for purposes of according Con- 
vention refugee protection when they 
are susceptible to serious harm for no 
other reason than being women. In- 
deed, this possibility was recognized 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
A.G. v. Ward. Mr. Justice La Forest 
noted that the first category of persons 
united by an innate or unchangeable 
characteristic would encompass indi- 
viduals fearing persecution on the ba- 
sis of their gender.3 Recognition of 
gender as identifying a social group is 
supported by the Canadian Gender 
 guideline^.^ 
Though the Supreme Court of 
Canada has clearly declared that gen- 
der can be the basis for identifying a 
particular social group, some confu- 
sion remains regarding whether gen- 
der alone can constitute the basis of the 
social group, or whether gender might 
be one characteristic that must com- 
bine with others to define the social 
group. The Canadian Guidelines are in 
part the source of this ambiguity, since 
they concede that while being a 
woman per se could entitle one to mem- 
bership in a social group, the size of the 
group could be limited by the common 
victimization or vulnerability of the 
members of the group to per~ecution.~ 
This approach attempts to define the 
group by reference to the nature of 
persecution feared. It also suggests 
that the group is defined by reference 
to gender and some other characteris- 
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tic, usually the common victimization 
which confronts group members. 
This was the position adopted by 
Mr. Justice Mahoney in the pre-Ward 
decision of Mayers v. M.E.le6 in which 
the Federal Court of Appeal held that 
the claimant belonged to a social group 
comprising "Trinidadian women sub- 
ject to wife abuse." Mahoney's ap- 
proach to the definition of a particular 
social group was adopted by Mr. Jus- 
tice Linden in Cheung v. M.E.1.' After 
reviewing the Mayers decision, Mr. 
Justice Linden concluded that 
"women in China who have more than 
one child and are faced with forced 
sterilization because of this form a par- 
ticular social group so as to come 
within the meaning of the definition of 
Convention refugee."8 
This approach finds further support 
from the Ward decision. By saying that 
a particular social group cannot be 
defined solely by reason of the com- 
mon victimization of its members, Mr. 
Justice La Forest appears to be suggest- 
ing that the common vulnerability of 
the group, combined with other 
characteristic(s) may be sufficient to 
delineate a particular social group. 
Thus, in spite of the guidelines for 
identifying the existence of a particu- 
lar social group outlined in the Ward 
decision-immutable characteristics, 
voluntary association for reasons fun- 
damental to human identity and 
former voluntary status-some post- 
Ward decisions continue to define gen- 
der-based social groups by reference 
to the common victimization which 
confronts its members. In Naruaez v. 
Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 
Mr. Justice McKeown took the position 
that women in Ecuador subject to do- 
mestic violence constitute a particular 
social group? 
This approach is problematic. 
Though the anti-discrimination ap- 
proach to identifying a social group 
presupposes that the members of the 
group are susceptible to victimization, 
naming a particular harm feared as the 
basis of defining the group deviates 
from the focus on immutability as the 
foundation of gender-based social 
groups. The common victimization 
confronting the group is of course not 
innate, and is clearly not the basis upon 
which the harm is feared. This critique 
has sometimes been acknowledged by 
the Canadian Immigration and Refu- 
gee Board, as in the case of America 
Torres. The claimant, a citizen of Ecua- 
dor, was allegedly fearful of persecu- 
tion by reason of her membership in a 
particular social group, i.e., abused 
women who do not receive any effec- 
tive protection from the home state. 
The panel was of the view that defin- 
ing a social group by reference to the 
particular harm feared is circular. "A 
claimant must fear persecution for a 
Convention reason. The Convention 
reason must preexist the persecution. 
To argue that someone is persecuted 
for the reason that she is persecuted is 
[nonsensical] ."lo 
It appears more logical to define 
groups in terms of vulnerability in gen- 
eralbecause of an innate characteristic, 
rather than by reference to particular 
forms of vulnerability." Understood 
in this way, women constitute a par- 
ticular social group both because of an 
innate characteristic that they share 
(gender), and because of their suscep- 
tibility to serious human rights viola- 
tions.12 The fact that not all women are 
targets of gender-related serious hu- 
man rights abuses at any one particu- 
lar time does not affect the designation 
of women as a particular social group. 
After all, all group members need not 
be at risk of persecution before they can 
be recognized as a "particular social 
group." This position has been af- 
firmed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In Brooks v. Canada Safeway 
Lt~i.,'~ the appellant, who became preg- 
nant while in the employ of the re- 
spondents, alleged that a group 
insurance plan maintained by the lat- 
ter that excluded payment of benefits 
to pregnant women during a seven- 
teen week period even if they suffered 
from an ailment totally unrelated to 
pregnancy amounted to sex discrimi- 
nation. The respondents were of the 
view that since not all women became 
pregnant, pregnancy related discrimi- 
nation was not sex discrimination. In 
allowing the appeal, the Chief Justice 
noted that pregnancy related discrimi- 
nation amounts to discrimination on 
the basis of sex, even though not all 
women become pregnant at any one 
time. He pointed out that pregnancy 
cannot be separated from gender. 
"While pregnancy-based discrimina- 
tion only affects part of an identifiable 
group, it does not affect anyone who is 
not a member of the group . . . This fact 
does not make the impugned distinc- 
tion any less discriminatory."14 
The prevalence of discrimination 
and violence against women, espe- 
cially in the so-called "private sphere," 
is common knowledge.15 Thus, being a 
woman in and of itself is so full of risks 
that some states have not been particu- 
larly enthusiastic in recognizing a so- 
cial group that potentially has millions 
of members. Such concerns are de- 
feated by the ejusdem generis approach 
since the other four categories-race, 
nationality, religion and political opin- 
ion-are characteristics which are also 
shared by large numbers of people.16 
The Canadian Gender Guidelines note 
that "the fact that the particular social 
group consists of large numbers of the 
female population in the country con- 
cerned is irrelevant-race, religion, na- 
tionality and political opinion are also 
characteristics that are shared by large 
numbers of people."" 
Just being a woman in some socie- 
ties, makes one susceptible to human 
rights violations committed with im- 
punity, particularly in the domestic, 
unregulated sphere.18 It is therefore 
not necessary to qualify the group 
"women" in order to remain faithful to 
the anti-discrimination logic of the 
nexus requirement. This appears to be 
Mr. Justice La Forest's position in A.G. 
v. Ward, where he simply listed gender 
without any qualification as the basis 
for idenwing a social group because 
it is an innate characteristic. The Cana- 
dian Immigration and Refugee Board 
has endorsed this approach to defin- 
ing gender-based particular social 
groups. In its update on the Gender 
Guidelines, the IRB unequivocally 
states that since gender is an innate 
characteristic, women may form a par- 
ticular social group within the Con- 
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vention refugee definition.lg In Fatin v. 
I.N.S. the United States Court of Ap- 
peals for the Third Circuit also en- 
dorsed a similar position when it 
that an Iranian applicant 
who feared persecution because she is 
a woman can be a member of a particu- 
lar social group.20 
Recognizing that women may con- 
stitute a particular social group does 
not, of course, automatically make all 
women eligible for Convention refu- 
gee protection. In view of the individu- 
alized focus of refugee protection, a 
woman will have to establish her mem- 
bership in the group that is demonstra- 
bly susceptible to persecution. Thus, 
eligibility for refugee protection based 
on gender defined social group turns 
on whether a woman has a well- 
founded fear of persecution in her 
home country because of membership 
in this group. In Cheung v. M.E.I., the 
Federal Court of Appeal pointed out 
that recognizing that women in China 
who have more than one child and 
threatened with sterilization consti- 
tute a particular social group did not 
automatically make all women in the 
group eligible for Convention refugee 
protection. "It is only those women 
who also have a well-founded fear of 
persecution as a result of that who can 
claim such status."*l 
Whereas in some countries, all 
women may be vulnerable to serious 
human rights violations, in many 
countries only a subset of the popula- 
tion of women will be at risk. In such 
cases, gender will be one form of civil 
or political status that together with an 
intersecting ground of claim (such as 
race, religion or other innate or funda- 
mental characteristics), will combine 
to define the particular social group. In 
view of the anti-discrimination pur- 
pose of refugee protection, these other 
characteristics should be immutable in 
the sense of being either innate or so 
fundamental to the identity or basic 
human dignity of the members that 
requiring them to forsake their belief 
will constitute a violation of their basic 
human rights. For instance, the Gender 
Guidelines Update recognizes that in 
addition to women being a particular 
social group, there may also be other 
particular social groups made up of 
subgroups of women. These groups 
maybe identified by reference to other 
immutable characteristics such as age, 
race, marital status or economic 
For example, in the Fatin case, the 
appellant's primary argument was not 
that she was at the risk of persecution 
simply because she is a woman. In- 
,stead, she alleged that she risked harm 
as a member of a "very visible and 
specific subgroup: Iranian women 
who refuse to conform to the govern- 
ment's gender-specific laws and social 
norms."23 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
found that the at-risk group did not 
include all Iranian women who hold 
feminist views, or even all those who 
object to the gender-specific rules in 
Iran. The group at risk of persecution is 
limited to those women who hold a 
particularly strong political or reli- 
gious opinion in opposition to the 
policies of the theocratic state. This cat- 
egory meets the test for a particular 
social group, since it combines two 
forms of immutable status, namely 
gender and political or religious opin- 
ion. 
Similarly, in Zekiye Incirciyan," the 
Immigration Appeal Board held that 
"single women living in a Moslem 
country without the protection of a 
male relative" constitute a particular 
social group. In this case, gender was 
combined with other characteristics to 
define the social group to which the 
claimant belongs. In his commentary 
on the Incirciyan decision, Hathaway 
justifies the identification of the social 
group as conforming to the anti-dis- 
crimination approach by pointing out 
that members have no control over 
their gender or absence of male rela- 
tives. He also notes that choice of mari- 
tal status is a fundamental human right 
that no one should be required to relin- 
quish. In view of the position that par- 
ticular social groups ought to be 
defined in terms of vulnerabilities in 
general rather than by reference to par- 
ticular forms of harms, perhaps the 
social group of which Incirciyan is a 
member should have been simply "un- 
married women." 
~ollowing from the immutability 
test, the particular social group in 
Cheung ought to have been identified 
as "women in China who have more 
than one child." This group is united 
not only be gender but also by a com- 
mon conviction-reproductive lib- 
erty-which is so fundamental to their 
human dignity that they should not be 
required to alter it. Of course, not all 
women in China with more than one 
child will be eligible for refugee status. 
As rightly pointed out by Mr. Justice 
Linden, only those women who have a 
well-founded fear of persecution by 
reason of their status can claim refugee 
protection. Since forced sterilization is 
not an innate or unchangeable charac- 
teristic, it should not be the basis for 
defining the social group. This ap- 
proach also ensures that eligibility for 
refugee protection is not limited to 
women threatened with forced sterili- 
zation but to those facing other forms 
of persecution as a result of having 
more than one child. 
In sum, there have been consider- 
able developments regarding the par- 
ticular social group category. It is now 
settled that a social group can be de- 
fined by the gender of its members. 
Although the determination of refugee 
status remains a national prerogative 
of states, there has, however, been will- 
ingness at both regional and national 
levels to recognize women as consti- 
tuting a particular social group, mean- 
ing that women confronted with the 
risk of gender-related persecution 
solely because of their gender are eligi- 
ble for refugee protection based on the 
social group category. Whereas all 
women are part of a social group, only 
those who are likely to be victimized or 
marginalized because of their gender 
will be eligible for Convention refugee 
protection as these will be the only 
persons within the category who are 
genuinely at risk of persecution. The 
class of at-risk women may sometimes 
be defined by reference to gender and 
other innate or fundamentalcharacter- 
istics, rather than the common victimi- 
zation, which distinguishes women in 
need of refuge from the general popu- 
lation. a 
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